When the Bank of Mauritius abolished exchange controls in July 1994 and let the rupee float, the promise was simple: a currency set free by markets, disciplined by fundamentals, would find its natural level — and a “competitive” rupee would carry the island's export sector into a new era of growth. Three decades on, the rupee has lost roughly two-thirds of its value against the dollar. The export sector it was meant to power now imports more than it earns. And the official language used to explain each fresh depreciation reads almost word for word like the language used to explain the last one, and the one before that.
This is worth pausing on, because it isn't really a
story about currency mechanics. It's a story about how a plausible economic
idea, applied without regard for the structure of the economy it was applied
to, calcified into an alibi.
The
idea, and where it broke
The theory behind the 1994 float was standard textbook
fare: a weaker currency makes your exports cheaper abroad, which should lift export
volumes, which should lift growth. Mauritius had just spent a decade
liberalising — interest rates freed in stages through the late 1980s, exchange
controls loosened progressively, capital account restrictions lifted — and the
float was the capstone. This was the dominant policy consensus of the era, and
Mauritius was a diligent student of it.
The trouble is that the mechanism only works cleanly if
a country's exports are not themselves built on imported inputs. Mauritius's
are. Its manufacturing and services sectors run on imported fuel, imported
machinery, imported intermediate goods and now on imported labour too. So a
weaker rupee doesn't just make Mauritian exports cheaper — it simultaneously
makes them more expensive to produce. The theoretical gain and the practical
cost arrive by the same channel, and depending on the sector, they can cancel
out or worse. The Bank of Mauritius knew this by the late 1990s: after the
rupee fell sharply in 1996, 1997 and 1998, the central bank spent the next several
years fighting the inflation that depreciation itself had fed, not export-led
growth.
That should have been the moment the underlying model
got revisited. It wasn't. Instead, the explanation shifted from "the float
will work" to "the float is working, we just need complementary
reforms" — and that reframing has held, with minor variations, for the
better part of thirty years.
The
recycled diagnosis
Read the IMF's Article IV consultations on Mauritius
back to back and the pattern is almost eerie. In 2014, the Fund noted that the
authorities, faced with falling competitiveness, believed structural reform and
labour productivity gains — not currency management — were the real fix. In
2019, months before the pandemic, the Fund was again flagging a deteriorating
external balance and an accommodative, expansionary policy stance alongside
calls to "regain competitiveness." By 2025, following a currency
collapse that the country's own Bank of Mauritius audit attributes
substantially to internal policy choices, the Fund's language is nearly
identical: the external position is weaker than fundamentals justify, and
structural reform is what's needed.
Ten years, the same diagnosis, the same prescribed
remedy, and a currency that has done nothing but slide. At some point a
repeated diagnosis that never produces a cure is not a diagnosis. It's a
script.
Two
convenient untruths
Two claims have done most of the work of keeping that
script alive.
The first is that productivity gains are the master key
— that if Mauritius simply reforms education, labour markets and ease of doing
business hard enough, competitiveness returns regardless of what the currency
does. This isn't false so much as radically incomplete: productivity reform is
slow, structural, and politically costly, which makes it a comfortable thing to
recommend and a comfortable thing to keep not quite finishing. It lets
policymakers point to a horizon goal instead of the balance sheet decisions
being made this quarter.
The second is that imported-input inflation is a
regrettable side effect of depreciation rather than a central feature of it. It
is not a side effect. In an import-dependent economy, it is close to the whole
story: the trade deficit pressures the currency, the weaker currency raises the
cost of the next shipment of fuel and inputs, and the loop tightens.
Mauritius's own trade data shows exactly this mechanism at work, with the
current account deficit widening even as officials describe the situation as
temporary.
What
TINA obscures
None of this means Mauritius had unlimited room to
manoeuvre. Small open economies exposed to global capital flows and tourism
receipts genuinely do face real constraints, and "there is no
alternative" is sometimes simply an accurate description of a narrow
reserve position. But TINA has been doing double duty in Mauritius: describing
a real constraint in the moment, while quietly erasing the question of how the
constraint was built.
It was built, in large part, by choices that had nothing
to do with market forces finding a natural level. Public capital injected into
failing banks in 2015 and 2016, financed off the state's own balance sheet.
Roughly eighteen billion rupees pumped into the system since 2019 — liquidity
creation that a government-commissioned audit later found had accelerated the
rupee's fall and stoked the very inflation officials were publicly attributing
to global shocks. The same audit went further, questioning whether the central
bank's independence had been compromised during this period. These are not the
actions of an economy passively absorbing an unavoidable external shock. They
are the actions of institutions repeatedly reaching for the balance sheet as
the path of least resistance, then describing the bill for it as fate.
Fatalism,
cynicism, or incompetence — probably all three, in sequence
It would be simpler if this were one villain: an
incompetent central bank, or a cynical government protecting narrow interests.
The record over thirty years suggests something less tidy and, in a way, more
damning — a form of institutional path dependency that has survived multiple
governments and multiple central bank governors.
The diagnosis has rarely been wrong; Article IV reports
going back over a decade correctly identified a widening external imbalance and
a weakening competitive position. What's failed, repeatedly, is the instrument.
Each time a hard structural choice presented itself, the easier lever was the
one pulled: recapitalise a bank rather than let it fail transparently and
account for the cost in the budget; inject liquidity rather than raise taxes or
cut protected spending; let the currency absorb the strain rather than confront
the interests that benefit from the status quo. None of this required believing
the depreciation story was false. It required only that believing it be
convenient — and after a decade of convenience, the belief and the convenience
became difficult to tell apart.
That is what makes fatalism the wrong word for where
things stand today. Fatalism implies nothing could have been done. Something
could have been done, repeatedly, by identifiable people in identifiable
institutions, and the record — including the country's own government audit —
says so in plain language. Whether that adds up to incompetence or cynicism is,
in the end, a less useful question than the one it's usually asked instead of:
whether the same institutions, faced with the same choice again, will reach for
the same lever.

